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From Kepler to Newton
a case of the divide et impera move

 Abstract
The divide et impera move in defence of scientific realism aims at answering the pessimistic meta-induction argument, by adopting a selective attitude when passing judgments about truth-likeness of theories. In what follows, the discovery of Kepler’s first two laws and the transition to Newtonian mechanics is presented in an attempt to highlight the diachronic element in this move. 
1. An argument for scientific realism
The basic tenet of scientific realism consists in the hypothesis that the best explanation of the success of scientific theories is their (approximate) truth. (Typically, success is taken to be adequately captured by appealing to a theory’s ability to produce novel predictions). Nevertheless, the historical record shows that the history of science is teeming with theories which were for one time in the past empirically successful and yet were eventually discarded as the claims they made about the deep structure of the world turned out to be false. On this basis, Laudan (1981) put forward the so-called pessimistic meta-induction which can be formalized as follows:
A)	The realist maintains that success of a theory is an indicator of (approximate) truth.
B)	Therefore, the realist deems currently successful theories (approximately) true.
C)	Past theories replaced by current ones were at one time empirically successful.
D)	Truth-likeness of currently successful theories implies that those past theories could not have been truth-like, despite their empirical success.
E)	Hence, there is no explanatory connection between empirical success and truth-likeness, and the realist’s assertion (A) is not warranted.
The crucial link is claim (D). To block it, Psillos (1999) proposed the divide et impera move; it amounts to refuting the claim that when a theory is abandoned all its theoretical constituents should be rejected en bloc. Instead, one should try to glean those theoretical constituents of a past theory that indispensably contributed to that theory’s successful predictions. Specifically:
1. Suppose that a theory contains a hypothesis H that, together with other hypotheses H΄ and auxiliary conditions A, leads to a successful prediction P:
H + H΄ + A  P.
2. H is indispensable in the sense that:
¬ (H΄ + A  P).
3. Assume furthermore that there is no other hypothesis H* available that can substitute H in the sense that:
a. H* is consistent with H΄ and A;
b. H* + H΄ + A  P;
c. H* satisfies certain reasonable epistemic conditions (Psillos 1999, p. 110).
If such a hypothesis H is found to have been retained in subsequent theories replacing the given one, it is likely that it played a crucial role in the abandoned theory’s success. 
I shall revisit the divide et impera move in an attempt to show how it can be strengthened by appropriately bringing out the diachronic element in it. My contention will be that in order to broach issues of indispensable contribution to success or retainment of constituents across theory changes one should keep track of the distinction between two sets of questions: those pertaining to interrelationships of different formative stages of one and the same theory; and those concerning the relations of two different theories in the process of theory change. To put it differently, a theory under study should be considered in its state of relative maturity. 
In this perspective, I shall concentrate on Kepler’s discovery of his first two laws and the transition to Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Moreover, it is important to highlight an aspect of Kepler’s insights which, to my knowledge, has not so far been given due attention. It concerns Kepler’s deployment of an argument akin to the divide et impera move. 
2. From mathematical model to physics (contra ‘more Hermetico’).
Kepler is the hero par excellence in the process of breaking with deeply ingrained mystical approaches, as he straddles two different eras. He emerged out of the Renaissance spirit, with its neo-Platonism, Pythagoreanism, and Hermetism. Yet, he ‘had an absolutely clear perception of the basic difference between genuine mathematics, based on quantitative measurement, and the “Pythagorean” or “Hermetic” mystical approach to number’ (Yates 1964, p. 440). Most clearly, in his controversy with Robert Fludd, he charges him with treating mathematics ‘more Hermetico’, while he, Kepler, ‘is concerned not with “Pythagorean intentions” but with reality (res ipsa)’ (op. cit., p. 443). It is precisely in this spirit that Kepler endeavored to correct the Copernican system. A guiding principle in his trailblazing discoveries was the constant striving to unravel the physical relations and causes of things. 
But there is even more to be said on this issue; for Kepler, in his defence of Copernican ideas and in the formative stages of his own astronomical theories, had to contend with objections with a familiar ring. In his Mysterium Cosmographicum (Kepler 1596/1999, henceforth MC), Kepler reasons as follows:
1. First, he objects to ‘saving the phenomena’ from a ‘realist’ point of view. 
2. Then, he articulates a variant of the pessimistic meta-induction argument: 
‘… the old tables and hypotheses [i.e., Ptolemy’s] … satisfy the appearances, yet they are rejected by Copernicus as false; and … by the same logic the reply could be made to Copernicus that although he gives an excellent explanation for what is observed, yet he is wrong in his hypothesis’. 
3. Answering this, Kepler appeals to a number of use-novel predictions of the Copernican theory.​[1]​ Then, he writes:
‘… of those hypotheses which give a reliable reason for the appearances, and agree with observation, Copernicus denies nothing, but rather adopts and expounds them. For although he seems to have altered a great deal in the customary hypotheses, in fact that is not the case. For it can happen that the same conclusion follows from two suppositions which are different in species, because they are both included in the same genus, and the point in question is a consequence of the genus’.
4. And Kepler concludes by explaining that ‘… what appearances Ptolemy did derive, he did not derive from a false and accidental intermediate premise. His only breach of the rules as such was that he believed the consequences which follow from the genus to follow from the species’ (MC, Ch. 1, pp. 75-77, emphasis added).
The similarity of Kepler’s argument with the divide et impera move is obvious, with an equally obvious twist: Kepler’s distinctive approach is to draw attention to a logical relationship, namely that of species and genus, in assessing the contribution of various features to success. Having all this in mind, let us now dwell upon Kepler’s work in more detail.
3. The ‘anima motrix’
It is well known that Kepler’s main insight, first developed in MC, was to consider the universe as constructed on the basis of the five Platonic solids. This idea was inextricably connected with Kepler’s conception of an anima motrix. The point is that Kepler argues against the view that the causes of planetary motions reside in each individual planet or orbit, and for the view that there is a single cause residing in the center of the whole system. What is relevant here is that Kepler was in a process of distancing himself from the mystical connotations of ‘anima motrix’ and seeking instead natural causes. 
Kepler’s change of mind is shown in his explicit rejection of ‘anima motrix’ and its replacement with the concept of ‘force’ (vis), as evidenced by Kepler’s own remarks in the second, 1621 edition of MC (MC, p. 203). This is no mere terminological trifle: Kepler, referring to AN, published in between the two editions of MC, makes his point quite explicit: ‘Those sublime considerations of the essence, motion, place, and operations of the blessed angels and of separate minds which some people will want to raise in opposition to me, are irrelevant. For we are arguing about natural things which are far inferior in dignity’ (Ch.6, p. 170, emphasis added).
Let us summarize Kepler’s endeavors in the first edition of MC in the form of a proposition:
(0)                                        H0 + H0΄ + Α0  P0,
where:
H0 is Kepler’s assumption of an anima motrix;
H0΄ is his conviction that Platonic solids underlie planetary orbits; 
A0 represents background assumptions about a Copernican-type heliocentrism; and
P0 stands for the observed motions of the planets.
In his subsequent work leading up to AN, Kepler had at his disposal Tycho Brahe’s observations and carried out observations of his own. He insisted on agreement of theory with data, yet he did not try to fit them into schemes that ‘saved the phenomena’. Though his insights were laden with his beliefs in the sun’s divinity and the harmony of the world, he did not allow them to dictate his theorizing. His own account in his AN reveals the seven phases of his ‘war on Mars’, as he called it, which led to his discoveries. 
4. The ‘War on Mars’
In Phases 1 and 2, Kepler introduced two new elements. First, he made observations using the real, visible sun as reference point, instead of following the usual practice of using the so-called mean sun, a fictitious point. Second, he devised a theory in order to calculate the heliocentric longitudes of Mars. In addition, he used a theory of Tycho’s which was known to give the heliocentric longitudes of the earth with great precision. At this stage, then, derivation (0) is replaced by the following:
(1)                                        H1 + H1΄ + Α1  P1,
 where:
H1 stands for Kepler’s conjecture about the central position of the real sun, together with his ideas about heliocentrism;
H1΄ represents the new geometrical model he formulated;
A1 includes Tycho’s theory; and
P1 are predictions to be tested against observational data.
Kepler saw that his newly formed theory was contradicted by the data. He called this theory his ‘vicarious’ theory.
It must be stressed here that it is not a question of coming to terms with the fact that false assumptions may lead to correct results, but of acknowledging the crucial role played by the recognition of the falsity and the efforts to overcome it, as Kepler himself points out: ‘But, my good man, if I were concerned with results, I could have avoided all this work, being content with the vicarious hypothesis. Be it known, therefore, that these errors are going to be our path to the truth’ (AN, p. 494, emphasis added). Kepler elaborates further on this question in Chapter 21 of AN, titled ‘Why, and to what extent, may a false hypothesis yield the truth?’ The explanation Kepler offers is that ‘There are, however, occasions upon which a false hypothesis can simulate truth, within the limits of observational precision’. And Kepler concludes with what amounts to a further elaboration of what he had to say about ‘genus’ and ‘species’ in MC: ‘It is at least now clear to what extent and in what manner the truth may follow from false principles: whatever is false in these hypotheses is peculiar to them and can be absent, while whatever endows truth with necessity is in general aspect wholly true and nothing else’ (AN, p. 298, emphasis added).  What all this means is that within falsity it may happen that there is a germ of truth which prevents the reasoning from going astray. 
5. Kepler’s two laws
Let us then return to the ‘war on Mars’. At this stage, Kepler had two theories: Tycho’s and his own. They were both Ptolemaic-type theories, assuming circular planetary orbits, with the sun positioned off-center. In addition, in order to account for the non-uniform motion of the planets, it was customary to assume that planets moved uniformly with respect to a fictitious point, the so-called equant. On the basis of observations, Kepler saw that the data seemed to support what is called the ‘bisection of eccentricity’, i.e., that the center of Mars’s orbit was in the middle of the line segment joining the sun with the equant. If Kepler modified his theory to fit the new data, then it would no longer predict the heliocentric longitudes correctly, but would give errors of about eight minutes of arc. Kepler’s conclusion marks a turning point: ‘… because they could not have been ignored, these eight minutes alone will have led the way to the reformation of all of astronomy’ (AN, p. 286). 
It is at such turning points that ‘idle wheels’ and essential elements are distinguished. In spite of Kepler not having quite weaned himself from the doctrines of the past, he did display a consistent orientation towards elements that tended to ‘latch on’ to reality. The very name ‘vicarious’ is quite telling, shedding light on how scientists themselves filter out the essential elements in the process of shaping their theories, and thus home in on crucial open questions, pointing at –hence connecting with– subsequent developments. 
Kepler had to reconsider. He spotted the most unphysical component of the vicarious theory as the first element to be jettisoned: the equant point. A likely replacement was the hypothesis of the bisection of eccentricity. In Phase 3 of the ‘war on Mars’, Kepler felt justified to generalize it for all known planets. This meant that, close to the line of apsides, the velocity of the planet varied inversely with its distance from the sun (Wilson, 1972). Hence, we have a new proposition:
(2)                                       H2 + H2΄ + A2  P2, 
where: 
H2 is the conjecture about the bisection of eccentricity;
H2΄ is the assumption of circularity retained in the vicarious theory;
A2 are the conditions for continuing with the use of the vicarious theory; and
P2 is the theoretical conclusion about the inverse relation of velocities and distances at the line of apsides.
Kepler cast his insight in the following equivalent form: the times in which a planet traverses small equal arcs are approximately proportional to the distances of those arcs from the sun. He then assumed the times to be proportional to the sum of the distances from the points of the arc contained within the sector determined by the arc. This led him to consider the area of such sectors as a measure of the sum of distances contained within it. Therefore, the areas could now be assumed to be proportional to the times needed for a planet to traverse equal arcs –and this is precisely the origin of Kepler’s law of areas. Kepler’s mathematics at this point is crude indeed. In a sense, it did capture aspects of real relations; however, to establish this, the development of modern calculus was needed. The point is that again, in the course of the historical period we are discussing, certain premises were put forward only to be replaced later by modified versions or to be rejected altogether. A further proposition at this stage would read:
(3)                                          H3 + H3΄ + A3  P3,
where:
H3 is Kepler’s assumption that times are proportional to distances;
H3΄ is his assumption that times can be taken to be proportional to the sum of distances;
A3 represents the doubtful mathematical methods that Kepler employed; and
P3 is the area law.
It must be stressed here that, in view of such shaky foundations, the area law, strictly speaking, cannot be considered a bona fide result of sound reasoning; instead, it constitutes a new hypothesis, not equivalent to the previous assumptions which it replaced (cf. Wilson 1970, 1972). 
In the next three Phases, 4, 5, and 6, Kepler used the area law in conjunction with a Ptolemaic-type theory and compared the results with the predictions of his vicarious theory. The conclusion was that the area law could not be reconciled with the assumption of circular orbits. After many horrendous calculations, Kepler arrived at the conclusion that the area law determined the shape of the orbit: it had to be elliptical –Kepler’s first law.​[2]​ Subsequently, Kepler found that his two laws were confirmed for Mars and the earth jointly, not only for Mars. Therefore, now we have:
(4)                                            H4 + H4΄ + A4  P4, 
where:
H4 is the area law;
H4΄ is the Ptolemaic-type of theory that Kepler used; 
A4 is his vicarious theory; and 
P4 is the conclusion that planetary orbits must be elliptical. 
Finally, Kepler turned to the core problem. What concerned him was the reason why the orbits were elliptical; in other words, he sought causal laws. Quite by chance, he happened on the secant of a certain angle, and he realized that a different way of measuring the sun-Mars distances gave a sinusoidal variation. This was very appealing, as a sinusoidal variation seemed to him to be ‘natural’ (AN, p. 547, marginal note). Trying to formulate a physical hypothesis, Kepler turned to an analogy with Gilbert’s theory of magnetic forces (AN, p. 550). It is precisely at this point that the essential element for the derivation of elliptical orbits –the area law– seems to fade in the background. The magnetic hypothesis becomes prominent, aided by the new insight of a sinusoidal variation of distances, while the area law is relegated to the position of an auxiliary assumption. In other words, we have:
(5)                                           H5 + H5΄ + A5  P5,
where:
H5 is the hypothesis of magnetic-type forces;
H5΄ is the sinusoidal variation of distances;
A5 is the area law; and
P5 stands for elliptical orbits.
Here we have a case of the negation of condition 2 in the divide et impera move, which concerns the indispensability of a theory’s component. In actual fact, both H5 and H5΄ are dispensable, irrelevant to the derivation of elliptical orbits. They were only theoretical posits representing Kepler’s abortive attempt at formulating a causal law. What Kepler actually proved boils down to the following proposition:
(*)                     given the area law, planetary orbits must be elliptical.
At this point, Kepler had reached his limits. His laws would only fall into proper place in the context of the Newtonian synthesis.
6. From ‘disposition’ to universal gravitation
Kepler, in his Introduction to AN, suggests the axioms for a ‘true theory of gravity’. The first is that the natural state of material bodies is rest. Then he writes:
‘Gravity is a mutual corporeal disposition among kindred bodies to unite or join together; … (The magnetic faculty is another example of this sort)’ (AN, p. 55, emphasis added).
Kepler’s first axiom was negated in the transition to Newton’s concept of inertia. Yet, the negated element in Kepler’s axioms goes hand-in-hand with the element that was retained in Newtonian mechanics: the italicized phrase could have very well been repeated verbatim by Newton in the context of his theory of universal gravitation. In Kepler’s own terms, both Newton’s gravitational force acting at a distance and Kepler’s corporeal disposition are the species, the genus being a universal interaction causing all material bodies to attract each other. The notion of a ‘magnetic faculty’ is what ‘is peculiar to the species’. 
The transition from Kepler to Newton was anything but straightforward. Kepler’s two laws were not universally accepted, either as confirmed empirically or proved mathematically. Alternatives were as a matter of fact put forward. Newton, in the course of his own investigations, first satisfied himself on the question of universality of gravitation and his inverse-square law of action-at-a-distance. These were new premises, though Newton was certainly aware of Kepler’s work. Notably, Newton, in order to verify his inverse-square law, based himself on Kepler’s third law, and only later turned his attention to the area law. 
Newton, therefore, formulated a new hypothesis:
(6)                                           H6 + H6΄ + A6  P6,
where:
H6 is the inverse square law of action-at-a-distance;
H6΄ are all three laws of Newtonian dynamics;
A6 are necessary abstractions and idealizations; and
P6 is the conclusion that orbits must be conic sections. 
Proposition (∗) was not relied upon; indeed, Newton, in a letter to Halley, considers it to be only a ‘guess’: ‘Kepler knew ye Orb to be not circular but oval & guest it to be Elliptical’ (quoted in Wilson 1970). Still, it did ‘latch on’ to reality, and was retained as a consequence of proposition (6). 
The whole process I outlined gives us reason to assert that all three conditions of the divide et impera move should not be viewed as fixed and immutable but rather as a codification of an evolving process of a given theory’s maturation, in which successive hypotheses and their mutual relations are constantly shifting, giving center stage to one component only to subsequently replace it, till a more or less stable picture takes shape. To say that there are no alternatives ‘H*’, as dictated by condition 3, means that we have reached the end product of the maturation process. It is when this diachronic element is brought to bear that the divide et impera move manifests its full force. In the case at hand, at the stage of Newton’s Principia, it is the inverse-square law in celestial mechanics that emerges as the appropriate element ‘H’ in condition 1 of the move. This final ‘H’ had to await general relativity for its own alternative. 
7. Newton explains Kepler
All this boils down to the fact that in the course of a theory’s maturation there is always the possibility of theoretical posits that in actual fact are impostors, revealed as such in the process of theoretical innovations. The significance of condition 3 in the divide et impera argument flows from the fact that the succession of assumptions and premises in the course of a theory’s development does not constitute a process of accumulation of elements responsible for that theory’s successes, but a process of distillation whereby those elements are selected. Couched in a vocabulary that leaves its imprint on the terminology of a nascent science, carried over from a bygone era, often full of mystical connotations and idle speculation, the concepts of a newly conceived outlook are being formed. It is a complex process, following a meandering route punctuated with false starts, errors, lucky coincidences, fruitful insights, laden with preconceptions and prejudices, struggling with data and in no small measure subject to chance circumstances. Accordingly, theories are not just ‘mixtures’ of constituents laid bare for us to pick from. The constituents responsible for their success are not read off easily, more often than not they must be teased out.
Following Psillos (2009), we may note that Kepler hypothesized by analogy with magnetism since he lacked a corpus of substantive background knowledge and, therefore, his approach was liable to come up against undercutting defeaters. This means that his deduction of elliptical orbits on the assumption of a magnetic force was only tentative and provisionally warranted pending further corroborating or undermining evidence for its soundness. Newton, on the other hand, provided a suitable novel background corpus, constituting a new conceptual framework in the context of which what with Kepler was speculative became coherent and precise. Newton’s law explains Kepler’s laws; the latter describe planetary motion while the former has excess content: Newton’s law not only entails Kepler’s laws, but generalizes them to the case of arbitrary central-force fields and conic sections for orbits, and, indeed, marks the unification of both celestial and terrestrial mechanics. It thus plays the role of a unifier providing a coherent whole within which Kepler’s laws –as well as Galileo’s and other pertinent law-like relations– can be fitted (Psillos 2002). Thus, the ‘plus’ sign figuring in the exposition of the divide et impera argument does not simply indicate addition of hypotheses, but also a logical relationship connecting them. 
8. A law in the role of Janus
Having established that the inverse square law constitutes the core element of classical celestial mechanics at its stage of relative maturity, it now remains to briefly examine whether and in what sense this element is retained in the theory of gravity that replaced Newton’s, i.e., general relativity. It is well-known that Newtonian mechanics is a useful approximation to dynamics on the scale of galaxies. However, caution is called for here: Alongside statements to the effect that, in concrete cases, ‘General Relativity exactly reduces to Newtonian theory’ (Mukhanov 2005, p. 10, emphasis in original), it is invariably stressed that ‘the Newtonian approach is incomplete: it is only valid (with justification from General Relativity) …’ (op.cit., p. 24, emphasis added) under definite conditions. This means that general relativity explains Newton’s law incorporating it within its own conceptual framework by stating explicitly the conditions of its (approximate) validity in general relativity’s own terms (i.e., in terms of the space-time metric and the energy-momentum tensor). The crux of the matter here is that recovery of the form of the old theory’s equations from those of the new one ‘in the limit’ does not imply approximate identity of theories; it only means that employing the old law is compatible with the premises of the law that superseded it. 
More specifically, since it is the new theory’s need to meet the challenges posed by the theory it replaced that drives conceptual revisions, continuity in theory change does not simply reduce to retaining the form of equations; conceptual innovation constitutes an integral part of the connection between the old and the new. To put it differently, the element that is retained in theory change is likely to incorporate the contradictions in need of resolution. In the case under discussion, in passing the torch from Kepler to Newton, the concept of inertial mass –identical with gravitational mass– was refined. It was on this basis that the contradiction inherent in the very foundations of classical gravitational theory was clearly exhibited. It is the problem recognized by Newton himself, in the face of which he declared, hypotheses non fingo (Newton 1962, Vol. II, p. 547): It ‘is inconceivable’ and ‘so great an absurdity’ the fact that ‘inanimate brute matter’ should be endowed with an ability –i.e., gravity– ‘innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else …’ (Newton 1962, Vol. II, p. 634). The contradiction was embedded in the conceptual load carried by the inverse square law. Indeed, Newton’s law depends directly on a number of implicit premises which were taken for granted throughout the period under consideration: a force field, expressed through a potential function, having its source in an idealized, inert, spherically symmetric massive body, extending uniformly in absolute, homogeneous and isotropic three-dimensional space, and acting instantaneously, independently of absolute time. It is the potential of such a force field that appears in general relativistic formulations, for example with respect to the so-called ‘Newtonian gauge’ in cosmological problems, while the conceptual leap alluded to above concerns the most radical revision of the accompanying premises. Therefore, when one considers the incorporation of a ‘Newtonian limit’ in the framework of general relativity, one should acknowledge the fact that this is true in the context of a revolutionary transformation of fundamental concepts. As a result, Newton’ inverse square law of action-at-a-distance is a kind of Janus: it points both to the past and to the future, being the culmination of previous developments and at the same time pregnant with developments yet to come. 
9. Divide et impera –cum grano salis
Taking a cue from Kepler’s insight about what ‘is peculiar’ vs. what ‘endows truth with necessity’, we can qualify the divide et impera move. In the case under consideration, the argument should be understood to address the following situation: In the process of maturation of classical celestial mechanics, the inverse square law explains the success of Kepler’s laws as truthful relations. In the process of replacement of Newtonian mechanics by general relativity, Einstein’s equations dictate the conditions under which Newton’s inverse square law successfully approximates, in a limited and rigorously defined way, the truth which is asserted by the new –not the old– theory. The new theory explains both the successes and the shortcomings of the old: It explains the successes by making explicit those constitutive premises of the old theory that were implicit and taken for granted (null curvature, for instance). It explains the shortcomings by attributing them to the old theory’s making an absolute of what was incomplete and one-sided. As a result, the realist claim is that truth as explanation of success of general relativity does not refute approximate truth as explanation of the inverse square law, despite the fact that general relativity replaced Newtonian mechanics. Hence, premise D in the pessimistic meta-induction argument is rendered invalid. What emerges in theory change, therefore, is a progression from less complete and crude to more complete and refined approximate truth, whereby the new theory can look back at the old and recognize in it a stage of its own historical development. Hence, alongside ascertaining retainment of old hypotheses, approximations etc., the question is to shed light, from the vantage point of the new theory’s claims to truth, on the conditions under which the old theory was able to catch a glimpse of the truth asserted by the new. 
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^1	  Kepler mentions ‘the number, extent, and time of the retrogressions’. 
^2	  Not quite. The fact that the sun must be at one focus was only later realized.
